Most aspects of our lives are governed by large, highly developed institutions that integrate several governance tasks under one authority structure. But theorists differ as to the mechanisms that drive the development of intricate governance systems from rudimentary beginnings. Is the emergence of regime complexity a symptom of the runaway accretion of impedimenta? Or does integration occur because a complex institution is better adapted to a complex environment? Here we examine the emergence of complex governance regimes in 5,000 sovereign, resourceconstrained, self-governing online communities, ranging in scale from zero to thousands of users.
devoted community members. In order to attain it an administrator must overcome the resource challenges that cause communities to fail.
After an administrator specifies the desired size of their community (ranging from the oughts to the hundreds), they are responsible for managing three types of public resource: "virtual" resources defined by the software platform (such as software-based currency or reputation systems), physically constrained resources (such as limited RAM, CPU, bandwidth, and the raising of monthly server fees), and antisocial behavior (such as vandalism, harassment, and hacking). These types span resource categories to include common pool resources, public goods, and "public bads," all of which pose problems for collective action (Dietz et al., 2003) . And they are very difficult to manage well. Vandalism and other in-game problems are endemic to the platform, increasingly so in larger communities. And because the software is so complex, the resources of a basic server will start to become strained with as few as 2 users, much less 200. In the face of RAM and bandwidth limits, the only alternative to constraining user freedom is assuming the running costs of a more powerful machine, and either provide it for free or solicit users for monetary contributions. On top of this, each community exists in a larger ecosystem of communities that are in competition for a fourth scarce resource: committed users, who have their pick of community to join. Any one of these resource problems poses an existential threat to a community. An administrator who fails to manage these resources stably, efficiently, or fairly risks the desertion of their core group to a betterrun community.
Fortunately, online communities are in a unique position to benefit from computational governance aids-software rules. In Internet communities, the challenges of collective action have been made more approachable with open-source catalogs of "plugins": modular programs that automatically implement rules and other political-economic constructs. Code in these communities is literally law. And by "mixing and matching" many such rule systems, an administrator can implement virtually any social structure.
For example, in the communities we study, administrators start from a default state of a near absence of rules, and approach a broad scope of resource challenges by selecting across four types of rule system: those that facilitate interpersonal communication, information diffusion, resource exchange, and top-down administrator control. All of these types have been implicated in improving outcomes in economic and collective action institutions (Janssen, Holahan, Lee, & Ostrom, 2010; Kimbrough, Smith, & Wilson, 2010; Mason, Jones, & Goldstone, 2008; Putterman, Tyran, & Kamei, 2011) .
Another key choice that administrators make in this platform is deciding the value of a mandatory server parameter: the maximum number of users who can be logged in simultaneously.
We use this setting as a proxy for each administrator's desired target population size, and we hypothesize that the success of a specific governance style is contingent on the size of population they aspire to govern. To measure success, we define it as the size of a server's "core group," the number of users who consistently returned at least once a week for at least one month. By measuring core group size with target size in mind, we define "success" with respect to administrator goals ( Fig. 1 ): a community with a core group of 10 is successful if it's target size is 10, and not if its target size is 100.
The 5216 independent communities in our dataset represent a wide range of sizes, with 1-30,000 confirmed visits per month, 1-3100 unique visits, target size from 2-284 (median 6), and success ranging from 0-400 (core group; median 1). The median lifetime of these communities was 8 weeks.
With multiple communities of multiple orders of magnitude all overcoming similar problems in a competitive setting, this platform lets us test the relationship between institutional complexity on governance success, as moderated by target population size. Following the claims of institutional diversity, that institutional complexity is a response to environment complexity (Becker & Ostrom, 1995) , we measure how communities develop in terms of three dimensions of regime complexity: the number of rule systems they install (rule count), the heterogeneity of rule types they represent (rule diversity), and the purview of those rules, in terms of number of resource problem types (rule scope). We use the intense selection pressure on this population of communities to justify a causal reading of our correlational analyses: governance regime causes success-not the other way around -because communities cannot succeed by our definition if they fail to solve the resource problems that constrain their size.
We find that larger and more successful communities have higher values of rule count and higher values of rule diversity (tested separately; Fig. 1 .; all p<0.001; Table S1 , S2 and SI). The rules of larger successful communities also cover greater scope (p<0.001). These factors seem to affect each other. A model with all terms together shows that rule count and rule diversity account for the overall change in rule scope, and rule diversity changes sign to decrease with both size and success when the other variables are taken into account (both p<0.001; Table S2 ). This flip is apparently due to larger communities' increasing reliance on rules that centralize power in the administrator, to the relative exclusion of other types of rules (p<0.001; Fig. 2 ; Table S3 ). This concentration of power in the administrator runs counter to the theory of institutional diversity.
Among resource types, bad behavior attracts the most governance effort, in terms of number of rules, and more effort as size increases (p<0.001). Looking beyond bad behavior, we find that larger successful communities also invest significantly more effort in the management of physically constrained resources (p<0.001; Fig. 2 ; Table S3 ). The consistency of these trends is especially interesting when we keep in mind the difficulty of collective action in this and other settings (Isaac & Walker, 1988; Ostrom, 1991) . Within our own sample, 64% of administrators fail to ever recruit a core group larger than themselves.
In the context of online self-governance, these increases in the number, scope, and heterogeneity of rules with success are consistent with institutional diversity's prediction that regime complexity is adaptive. And our context-sensitive definition of "success," as relative to each community's own target size, implicates population size as a major driver of regime complexity. However, our findings do not support institutional diversity predictions about the "polycentric" distribution of power over many scales. And although the ideas of community and small-scale governance often imply democratic aims, the communities we study here are not democracies. By default, a single administrator maintains control and, as we show, their power and authority increases with size, at the expense of other styles of governance. While it may be tempting to interpret this as an emergence of autocratic rule, it is important to be mindful of the evolutionary dynamic that binds these communities: communities actively compete for users, and users have unrestricted freedom to "vote with their feet" at low or no cost (SI) (Hirschman, 1970) . Under these conditions, communities with concentrated authority structures can only be succeeding because users prefer them. Because we, like those who formulated the hypothesis of institutional diversity, are inclined to romanticize decentralization of political authority (Ostrom, 2005; Scott, 2009) , this finding reminds us of the value of leadership in collective action (Dasgupta & Beard, 2007; Warren & Visser, 2016) , and it favors various economic theories of the state (Hirschman, 1978; Olson, 2013) , such as the utopian thesis of Nozick (Nozick, 1974 ) that when tyrants must compete, market forces can drive them to govern as if they were benevolent.
The Internet has empowered normal people to easily craft and deploy whole social systems, and to attract and maintain vibrant communities of total strangers. As online communities thrust millions around the world into the shared management of resource systems large and small, these unwitting amateur institution designers find themselves struggling to manage a disparate bundle of collective action problems. Studying their failures and successes promises not only to advance fundamental questions about resource governance (Ostrom, 2007; Poteete & Ostrom, 2008) , but to cultivate in citizens a native comfort with the skills, in both governing and being governed, that demanding institutional forms like democracy require. Of course, even though the frameworks we rely upon were developed precisely to generalize across vastly different socioecological settingsfisheries, forests, and irrigation systems (Ostrom, 1991) -there are bound to be properties of virtual communities that impede the generalizability of existing theory. For example, the substantial effort devoted to managing bad behavior might mostly be explained by the platform's demographics, which recall William Golding's Lord of the Flies. And logging out of a server is much less costly than emigrating from a nation. Nevertheless, at a time when technology is empowering and connecting more people, online communities contribute to a unified view of human institutional development-trade treaties to town halls, businesses to bulletin boards, al hima to harambee-and help more people to benefit from the sciences of social design.
Data and Methods
The community platform we focus on, the multi-player "virtual world" game Minecraft, is an ideal domain for our questions because it is one of few games with a decentralized amateur-driven hosting model. Logging into a multiplayer world usually means logging into a server somewhere in the world that is being provided by an unpaid private amateur without governance experience.
Independent of the game experience, merely being logged in imposes a substantial burden on that server's computational resources, one that threatens to undermine the game experience for all. Also, the fact that most users are anonymous youth makes collective action on this platform particularly challenging for a server administrator (Almas, Cappelen, Sorensen, & Tungodden, 2010; Fehr, Glätzle-Rützler, & Sutter, 2013) , and correspondingly more interesting for the study of social dilemmas in resource management.
Our analysis was based on a longitudinal dataset of API queries from 370,000 Minecraft servers contacted between 2014/11 and 2016/11 approximately hourly. Our scraper accessed each community for several public server performance statistics, including rules installed, maximum simultaneous users allowed (server "size"), and anonymous IDs of users present. After filtering out disconnected servers (~220,000), those did not survive for at least one month (~70,000), and those did not report full governance information (~75,000), we had a corpus of 5,215 minimally viable, minimally comparable online server communities.
Administrators select software rules from a single central community-managed plugin repository. Within this system, each is assigned by its author to a category that describes what type of rule it is. We used these categories to classify rules into types, and to count each community's rules by its governance characteristics. A community's rule count is the sum of plugins over all three resource types. A community's rule diversity and rule scope (resource diversity) are the ecological variety (number of types) represented by it total system of rules. We also calculated rule specialization, which indicated how unique a community's rules were in the population of communities. It was insignificant after modeling for controls.
Our main statistics regress core group size and population maximum against these four measures of institutional diversity and the interactions of each with community target size, and several basic covariates (SI; Table S1, S3;). To cancel the leverage that unsuccessful communities had on models of population size (which did not control for core group), we conducted all tests on population maximum on only the subset of 1800 minimally successful communities (core group size > 1). Figures   Fig. 1 . Most communities are small and unsuccessful. Larger successful communities have more rules, of more types, governing more kinds of resources. We analyze 5200 amateur-run web server communities. Each server is operated by an administrator who makes all governance decisions. Among these decisions is the population maximum or size (x-axis), the maximum number of users who may participate at any moment. This number represents an administrator's desired community size and puts a practical upper bound on the community's maximum core group size or success: the number of users who return to the community regularly (y-axis; all plots). Unique monthly visits to many of these communities exceed the thousands. A. We summarize the data in a 2D histogram of all communities binned by success and size, with each bin reporting the number of communities within the given range. Most communities have size 4-16, and most fail to grow a core group larger than one. The most interesting communities, those with the largest core group for their class, are along the diagonal upper edge of each plot. The bins' shade of grey, their number labels, and the gray ticks along the upper and left margins all communicate the same distributional information redundantly: the number of communities by size and success. B. Administrators select their community's governance regime by installing combinations of software modules that implement rule systems. This panel shows the mean number of rules in use by communities in a bin. C. and D. plot different diversity metrics. All rules address some resource problem with some kind of rule. There are different problems and different rules (Fig. 2 ). Panel C. shows that large successful communities use a greater variety of rules types ("rule diversity"). Panel D. shows that they attend to a greater variety of resource problems ("rule scope"). Table S1 . Model descriptions.
- Table S2 . Main model fits.
- Table S3 Table S1 . Model descriptions. Rows describe the models of this analysis, which focus on two dependent variables, population maximum and core group size. The two "_ctl" model rows describe models for each dependent variables that fit only controls. The eight "_one" models test each governance variable on its own. They are aggregated in this 
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Data context
Self-hosting on the Internet A server is a computer that provides services that other computers can access through the physical network structure of the Internet. These services can be of many types, and while the most familiar type of service is of web pages to the World Wide Web, other services support other modes of interaction. For example, multi-player game servers can foster social interactions in virtual worlds. Even though most of our interactions on the Internet are through professionally managed servers, the barriers to amateur hosting are low, and it is increasingly common for public online community services to be hosted by non-professionals with only a modicum of technical skill. Amateur hosting brings the time and money costs of maintenance to a server's main administrator, likely an individual with access to limited resources. Any efforts that that administrator makes to solicit resource provisioning assistance from users makes their behavior relevant to questions of governance posed by the frameworks of self-organizing resource management.
Minecraft
Minecraft is a popular multi-player virtual world game notable for its open unplotted structure and a decentralized hosting model that permits amateurs to host instantiations of the game on servers they manage that are, by default, open to the Internet. This study is based on data from a continuous survey of public data from 300,000 Minecraft server IPs over two years.
From what studies exist, scientific and otherwise, we can build a coarse sense of the demographics of the Minecraft user base. We estimate that approximately 80-90% of players are male and that the median player is a young adult (age 19) (Canossa, Martinez-Hernandez, & Togelius, 2013; French, Stone, Nysetvold, Hepworth, & Red, 2014) . 1 Out of the global community of users, the majority are based in the US and northern Europe. We do not have statistics on administrator demographics, but because of the technical skills and monetary costs required to administer a server, they are likely slightly older than normal players on average.
Another dimension of social context to consider is that users are often acquainted in real life.
One study of smaller game teams found that 75% of virtual colleagues are real-world friends or family (Williams, Ducheneaut, Xiong, Yee, & Nickell, 2006) . By reducing anonymity and freedom from consequences for antisocial behavior, real world acquaintance raises the accountability of users to each other, and may to some extent supplant the function of installed rules. We predict that non-observable informal avenue for norm enforcement is more likely in smaller communities, which provides an alternate, but non-competing hypothesis for why software rules increase in number with population maximum.
Minecraft servers
To host a Minecraft community, a prospective administrator rents or buys access to a server, installs and configures the game's server software, installs plugins, and may then log in. When the server is started, a unique world is generated from a random seed.
Administrators create rules and other modifications to their server by installing plugins.
Plugins are small programs that are designed to modify server functionality in a well-defined way.
While many plugins add frivolous functionality (in the literal sense that they foster play), many are explicitly developed to aid in the governance of specific resources, either by implementing single rules (like narrow proscriptions on possible behaviors) or larger self-contained institutions (such as markets or social hierarchies). While administrators may certainly deliberate with their users before installing new plugins, they are free to act unilaterally, and typically do.
Administrators must then attract a user base. They may recruit from among personally known peers, and they often advertise their community at a larger scale on web sites that provide users with searchable lists of servers, explained below.
Minecraft ecosystem
Server lists and the administrator community. Communities compete for users through server list sites. 2 To aid prospective users in their decision between communities on a list, developers devised a public query API that exposes basic realtime statistics about the state and health of a community, such as its version, currently active population (with unique public user IDs), its maximum population, and so on. Server lists query communities for this information and present it to prospective users give them honest quality signals about each community. This information is made available by default on all servers. It is what we use to compute the governance style and success of each server in our corpus.
Because servers compete for users, and because users can join and leave voluntarily at low or no cost, the Minecraft ecosystem unwittingly implements the "market for tyrants" theory of utopia described by Robert Nozick in Anarchy, The State, and Utopia (Nozick, 1974) . We use this characteristic to explain why observed governance characteristics in our population may reflect the institutional preferences of users rather than those of administrators. Others have shown that even leaders with a history of corruption can be incentivized to work in the interests of those they serve (Avis, Ferraz, & Finan, 2016) .
Plugin sites and the developer community. Use of server lists, and competition between servers, are dimensions of the larger ecosystem of code, culture, and communities within which each server operates. Another dimension important to this study are "mod" sites 3 where developers have converged to create a central repository of open source plugins.
In games such as Minecraft, collections of plugin grow into fully fledged ecosystems as a platform's power users coordinate in the programming and free distribution of useful tools. The broader Minecraft community has developed almost 20,000 plugins, although nearly 90% of plugin the top 500 of which account of nearly 90% of activity.
To help administrators make sense of the large number of modifications, developers are required to assign each plugin they write to at least one pre-specified category. We use these categories in this study to assign rules types, described in full detail in the Data Constructs section.
Some categories describe institutions and rules to aid online resource management. Of course, the 2 such as http://minecraftservers.org plugins in most categories, such as "Mechanics," "World Editing," and "Fun," are frivolous in the literal sense that they foster play by expanding game features and mechanics. While play is an interesting subject, the focus on this work is on the resource-related collective action challenges that administrators overcome in the process of supporting play and other user interactions.
Data constructs Administrators
One fundamental assumption of our analysis is that administrators are motivated to build community and overcome collective action problems that attend community, and that they pursue this goal by means they consider effective. Server administration is costly in time and money, and the game can be played in a "single-player" mode without a server, so we infer that administrators go to the additional difficulty of enabling social play over the Internet because they desire it enough to incur costs.
By contrast to administrators, normal players' motivations are more opaque and varied. For this reason, we structured the analysis so that our conclusions require boundedly rational choice from administrators, not users. A less vital assumption is that each server has a single administrator, and that that administrator monopolizes administrative decision-making. While this structure is customary, it is not mandatory. It may be that administrators provide administrative access to multiple players. We cannot observe this, but because a server can ultimately only be run one way, the outcome chosen by a group of decision makers is still a comparable to that chosen by a single decision maker, and it is safe to model that group as if it is a unitary agent.
Size
There are many ways to define the size of a community, such as its number of monthly visits, number of unique visits, or return visits. Instead, we use the population maximum, the value of a server parameter that limits the maximum number of simultaneous users. A downside of the population maximum parameter is that it underestimates other more intuitive definitions of size. For example, a server with a maximum of 100 may be visited by thousands of unique players in a month. However, this measure also has a number of advantages:
-Unlike other potential measures, which are based partly on the results of an administrator's behavior over time, population maximum is set directly by the administrator upon installing the server. It captures an administrator's intentions for their server.
-Servers can handle indefinite load when that load is distributed sparsely over time. A server starts to encounter its performance limits only when it must handle many simultaneous requests. These performance limits are due to finite CPU, RAM, and bandwidth (which are among the resources that administrators must manage). The population maximum is a satisfactory definition of server size in part because it is directly subject to resource constraints and must be set with them in mind. Administrators must balance their desired community size against their server's performance limits, and an administrator's choice to aspire to a large community comes with the knowledge that they must arrange for sufficient resources to give that number of simultaneous users a good experience. The consequences of under-provisioning a high traffic server are network lag, low frame rate, unsynchronized interactions, lost connections, and other features that quickly turn users away.
-Because it must be manually updated, a server's population maximum is likely to remain stable and unchanged over months. When this important parameter does change, it is because the administrator intentionally changed it. -Although it is very different in definition from the core group variable, population maximum also puts a soft upper bound on core group size. We observe 2 out of 5000 instances in which a community's core is larger than its number of simultaneous users.
Community
We evaluate servers in terms of the success of their administrators in recruiting a core group of committed community members. We define success specifically as the number of users who returned to that community at least once a week for a month. In contrast to raw number of visits over a time period, intermittent returns indicate a sustained level of interest and commitment in an environment in which many other communities are competing for each user's attention. Months are meaningful time units because they define the customary billing cycle for server hosting, because it takes about a month to bring a community to a mature state of development by the game's constructs, and because most servers survive for only 0-3 months.
With this measure of success, the basic unit of analysis is the server-month. An alternate quantification of community might have focused on the number of people who visited or returned over the entire lifetime of that community. However, because communities varied widely in their lifetime, focusing on server-months improved the comparability of the longest to the shortest lived communities.
To make success relative to administrators different goals, our figures consider each server's core group size plotted against its maximum population, and our models capture other interactions between these variables. Resource management and related frameworks The frameworks of resource management economics are valuable for understanding successful administration of an online community. We focus on the frameworks of the Ostrom Workshop, which have been used to study other kinds of online communities (Kollock & Smith, 1996; Pitt, Busquets, & Macbeth, 2014; Sadia, Garg, McCoy, & Greenstadt, 2013; Schweik & English, 2012) .
Community building, online and in general, is attended by a number of collective action problems that derive from the special properties of different resources, particularly the properties of non-excludability and subtractability. A non-excludable resource is one that is not subject to private ownership in the sense that an agent cannot prevent others from accessing or consuming that resource. A subtractable resource is one that is finite: consumption by one agent constrains the potential consumption of it by another agent. Common pool resources are defined as nonexcludable and subtractable (Ostrom, 2010) . They are vulnerable to over-extraction via the mechanism of the Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968) , a property that unifies otherwise disparate commons such as fisheries, forests, and irrigation systems (Ostrom, 1991) . Public goods are also non-excludable but they differ from common pool resources in being defined by their nonsubtractability. Examples include breathable air in a room, radio broadcasts, uncongested public roads, and other public infrastructure. Because they are not limited, the social dilemma commonly associated with public goods is concerned with ensuring maintenance rather than regulating access: public goods can require maintenance (or, more generally, "provisioning") in order to continue to benefit a population, and the same individual incentives that drive the over-extraction of common pool resources can drive the under-provisioning of public goods (Schmitt, Swope, & Walker, 2000) .
Public bads, another type of resource, have the same properties as public goods except provision tends to be costless and their externalities are negative rather than positive. The archetypal public bad is pollution. The collective action problem posed by public bads is discouraging their provisioning by suppressing the behaviors that provide for them.
Understanding a community's resources in these abstract terms makes community success amenable to frameworks that have been developed for analyzing community resource management. In the case of Minecraft communities, administrators must work to manage public goods and common pool resources of three types: physical, virtual, and, more abstractly, antisocial behavior, which can be situated into the framework of a public bad. Physical resources. The administrator usually has exclusive or de facto exclusive access to their server's overall status, underlying settings, and total available resources. Resource intensive applications such as Minecraft require increasing amounts of CPU, RAM, disk, and network bandwidth for each additional user on the server. Because an administrator, by default, cannot keep a player from logging on, a server's computing resources can be classed with common pool resources or congestable public goods. And because Minecraft defines a large, dynamic, real-time, 3D virtual world, these resources are very easily stressed, with standard recommendations prescribing about 5 GB of disk space, 1-3 Mbits/s of up-and download bandwidth, and 1 GB of RAM per player in order to provide players an acceptable level of moment-to-moment responsiveness. 4 These sometime prohibitive requirements can themselves quickly become inadequate in the presence of malicious users who intentionally undermine service by triggering resource-intensive game events.
When computational resources are inadequate, the server will become unresponsive to player actions. This is called lag, and players are sensitive enough to it that it need only persist for a few minutes for them to leave for another server.
Additionally, administrators require monthly fees to maintain their connection to the Internet, whether hosted privately or through a firm. While it is possible to pay nothing to provide a public server, the typical amateur will begin paying about $10USD/month, and an administrator of a large, popular community may pay hundreds per month. While these figures may not sound like much compared to the millions invested in fisheries, for example, it is worth remembering that administrators are usually volunteers, and often teen-aged. Administrators are responsible for the payment of these fees by default, at which point the server itself is being provided as a public good to its players. When administrators use specialized plugins to raise fees from players, they are engaging with the well known problem of provisioning a public good. Failing to provide computing resources at sufficient quality or capacity undermines players' experiences and makes them likely to leave a community.
Virtual resources. Minecraft itself defines many virtual resources. We focus on in-game common pool resources that require both provisioning effort and responsible extraction. These are chests, crops, trees, and mobs. All of these are by default non-excludable, subtractable, and take effort to provide for. Many plugins assist in the management of these resources. For example, the Lockette 5 plugin gives players private property rights over chests (making them excludable), and LogBlock 6 improves monitoring of the virtual environment by producing ubiquitous access logs.
Bad behavior. Bad behavior is endemic enough to Minecraft, that it is referred to within the community as "grief." Most (but not all) servers admonish players to not grief each other. Because the game's world is so open-ended, users can find many creative and hard-to-detect ways to harass each other. Harassment can take the form of chat-based insults or virtual violence, hacking a server, cheating by covertly installing performance aids on the client side, vandalism of the work of others, cursing, or otherwise behaving outside the bounds set by the administrator. Bad behavior can also affect server performance: malicious players will commonly start large virtual fires, or grow a large virtual animal populations. These dynamic game entities require computational resources to represent individually, so if an attacker can arrange them to grow exponentially, even for a brief period, they can effectively deny service to the rest of the community.
The plugins of the Minecraft ecosystem provide a very wide range of partial solutions to the problems of bad behavior. These include temporary bans, full exile and blacklisting, hacking counter measures, cheater detection, peer monitoring and reporting tools, admin surveillance tools, distribution of authority to trusted members, and tools for keeping and restoring backups after attacks.
No resource. Many plugins in use by servers did not identify a resource, or did not identify themselves as relevant to governance. We excluded these from the analysis, except in the form of a control variable that tracked the raw number of plugins separately from the number of resource related plugins.
Rule types
We describe four types of software rule system recognized by the plugin developer community for addressing these various resource problems: "chat," "informational," "economy," and "admin tools." These strategies are not only common in Minecraft, but are recognized in the study of resource management generally.
Chat plugins are those that facilitate inter-player communication, either by expanding built-in capabilities, creating new communication channels, or improving the interoperability of multiple communication schemes. By default, users can only communicate via text chat, but various plugins enable the higher bandwidth of voice chat. Rules that improve communication have a recognized role in frameworks for institutional analysis (Ostrom, 2010) , and unconstrained communication is known to be valuable in many resource governance settings (Janssen et al., 2010) , including Minecraft, which has plugins to support VOIP platforms such as Skype, Discord, and Teamspeak. In one case, a server that managed antisocial behavior with a 16+ age limit verified compliance with that limit by requiring all users to communicate via voice chat.
Informational plugins are those that aggregate data for users and administrators and improve their knowledge of strategic decisions. Information rules are another type of rule that are recognized as important in frameworks for institutional analysis (Ostrom, 2010) . In Minecraft, the informational plugin Dynmap 7 help users monitor each other's locations and activities.
Economy plugins install private property rights and exchange mechanisms to permit players to trade in both virtual and physical resources. These plugins function as self-contained institution modules that administrators can use to ensure that certain resource distribution problems solve themselves. While most economy plugins restrict themselves to the distribution of virtual resources, some economy plugins, like Buycraft 8 , allow players to by higher social rank for cash toward covering server fees.
Administrative tools are plugins that increase beyond the default the actions that the administrator can perform. These plugins help administrators exercise greater control over server state and player behavior. For example, the popular OpenInv 9 plugin allows administrators to covertly search and remove (potentially forbidden) belongings from their users' inventories.
Data processing
We compiled a list of 376,576 Minecraft server addresses by querying for IPs from multiple sources 10 over two years. After filtering for communities that were minimally viable and minimally comparable, our final dataset was 5,216. We also identify, within these, the 1,837 minimally successful communities.
Minimally viable
Of 376,000 servers, only 157,747 ever responded to our queries, and only 91,271 remained live for at least the span of one minimally costly month.
Minimally comparable
Our comparative analysis of governance schemes across communities required them to share a minimum number of common characteristics. All communities had to have a valid API and report full community and governance data. This step reduced our sample from 91,271 to 5,216 server communities. API is trustworthy. Servers' APIs are used to communicate information that prospective users use when deciding whether to join. But servers are customizable enough that administrators can undermine the ability of the platform's API to correctly report its performance statistics. We filtered out servers that were using special plugins that falsify this data in order to present more appealing statistics to players and server lists. We also filtered out servers reporting impossible values, such as a maximum population of zero or less. Administrators can also install plugins that link many worlds into larger collections of servers. In these "multiverse" servers, API statistics fail to capture the extent of an administrator's community, so we also excluded them from our analyses.
Full reporting. The basic API reports statistics such as a server's maximum simultaneous users and list of users present. Beyond these basic statistics, administrators can opt in to a more full version of the API in order to more effectively compete for users. It is this version of the API that reports a server's installed plugins, which we required in order to characterize a server's governance regime. Only about 10% of servers use the full version of the API. Because enabling the extended API improves the transparency of a community to prospective users, this filtering step amplified the bias in our analysis for administrators who are motivated to recruit widely for visitors and core members. This source of bias would seems more likely to support than undermine our conclusions, particularly because it provides an additional filter for administrators that are highly motivated to overcome resource challenges toward building a devoted community.
Minimally successful
An additional criterion that we included for a subset of our analyses is that a server was "minimally successful," with a core group of size greater than one. We used this subset of 1837 out of 5216 servers to test governance factors against group size. We did this because we did not want unsuccessful servers to drive the results of our tests, and we wanted to be able to interpret results over size as valid across the range a minimally successful servers. We did not include success as a covariate because our tests of success were already using population maximum as a covariate, and because administrators have more control over the value of the population maximum parameter than over then number of users that become community members. To manage the issues surrounding multiple tests of interacting constructs, we followed the procedure for multiple testing laid out by mediation analysis. Starting with models of population maximum, we moved to models of core group size that included population maximum as a control.
Unit of analysis
The servers in our sample varied widely in the number of weeks that they persisted. In order to control for the relative over-representation of longer lived servers (because they endured for more server months), we aggregated the data down to the scale of server-months and completed our dataset by selecting the most successful month of core group activity in the lifetime of each server.
By selecting the month that a server reached its peak core group we improved the comparability of administrators by comparing them at their peak community building performance. This is the month in each server's lifetime when it is safest to assume that the administrator is highly motivated to accomplish the goal of building community. Alternatives would have been to select a random month, the very first month, or the very last month, or to control another way for the differences in sampling density of each server/administrator (and correlation of sampling density with success via longevity).
Data analysis
Our central statistical tests regress core group size against five measures of regime complexity and the interactions of each with server target size, and several basic covariates. After describing the variables we described the tests.
Variables DVs -Core group size. This is the number of people who visited the server at least once a week during a server month. This is a main dependent of interest.
-Population maximum. This is the maximum number of users allowed simultaneously on a server.
It is set by the administrator. Because some users set this astronomically high (enough to throw off our analysis), presumably to signal that they did not intend an upper limit, we capped this value at that maximum number of users ever observed simultaneously on any server. We log transform the variable in our models.
IVs: Controls -Week. To capture large-scale fluctuations in the popularity of Minecraft, we included as a covariate the number of weeks from the Unix epoch, scaled.
-Weeks up. To capture potential effects of a server's age on its governance characteristics, we included a term for the number of weeks between the server month of interest and the date that our scraper first contacted the server.
-API richness. Servers vary in how much information they make available through various APIs, beyond the minimum required for our study. We included it in our models because it may be related to the willingness of users to visit a server, or to the level of involvement of the administrator.
-Software count. This is the number of plugins installed on the server, whether or not they are related to governance. This is in contrast to the rule count variable below, which counts only governance related plugins.
-Population maximum. Described above as a dependent. In addition to being a dependent of interest in itself, we also use this variable as a covariate and interaction variable in models of the other dependent, core group size. Because it effectively puts an upper bound on the size of a community's core group, the two are likely to be correlated. IVs: Governance variables -Rule count. This is the number of rules that are involved in the governance of some type of resource. It equals the sum of rules by resource type. It does not equal the sum of rules by rule type, because some rules are categorized to have multiple types, and some have none. Of course, some plugins install many rules, and some are very simple, but rule count nevertheless provides a proxy for the size of a server's governance system.
-Rule diversity. We identify plugins in terms of four rule types. Some servers use many rules of many types, while others use a smaller variety of types. We capture diversity of types in a variable by counting the number of types of rules represented on a server. This number of types is known in ecology as variety. We use variety instead of entropy because many servers have a very small number of rules, and entropy is known to be sensitive to small sample sizes and bin of size zero.
-Rule scope (or "resource diversity"). Rule scope is the range of resource problems that a server is using plugins to address. We use the ecological variety, number of types, for the same reason that we use variety to quantify rule diversity. -Rule specialization. Because plugins are made publicly available, many communities use many of the same plugins, with the most popular plugins in use on tens of thousands of servers. The rule specialization of a server was the median of the number of other servers also using each plugin it was using. In our models we actually used the inverse of this count in order to define servers without any plugins as having rule specialization equal to zero. This fourth variable is insignificant in all tests. Exploratory analysis shows that its effects are accounted for by the software count control in single variable tests, and likely also by rule count in the full models.
Model Specifications
We used a mix of univariate and multivariate models on two dependent variables to understand the relationship between size, success, and various governance variables of interest. For all of these the unit of analysis was the server-month, with the dependent variables being the size and success of a server (population maximum and core group size). Though we do not characterize our analysis in terms of the statistical concepts of mediation or moderation, we followed the procedure established by moderated mediation analysis for testing over multiple dependent variables, first testing effects on population maximum, then testing effect on core group size with population maximum as a control variable and in interaction terms. Tables 1, 2 , and 3 describe our models and their effects.
We modeled the logarithm of population maximum in five regressions, one that fit Week, Weeks up, API richness, and Software count, as well as Rule count, Rule diversity, Rule scope, and Rule specialization, and four "single variable" models that fit the controls with just one of each of the governance variables. We used this range of tests to help us understand the relationship of the governance variables with each other. For example, rule scope is significant when modeled alone, but its effects seem to be accounted for by a combination of the other three (Table S3 ). And the positive coefficients for rule diversity alone become negative when considered in the context of the other variables, suggesting an overall increase in the diversity in rules with size, caused by the other variables, that is strong enough to mask a net decrease in diversity when they are all taken into account (Table S3 ). All models of population maximum were conducted on the subset of minimally successful communities-those with core groups > 1. This eliminates the inordinate influence of failed communities on our tests, and permits us to interpret any effects of size in terms of successful communities only.
We then modeled core group size with the same terms as above, plus the logarithm of population maximum and its interactions with each of the four governance variables. As above, we fit one full model with all four governance variables and four more models fitting each governance variable alone. Because core group size is a count of events-arrivals on a server-and because the baseline rate of these events varies by server, we used a negative binomial regression, in which parameter theta is understood as a dispersion over the lambdas of a population of Poisson processes.
For both the models of population maximum and core group size, Chi-squared tests of the full models against controls-only models showed a significant difference in variance explained, while tests of the single-variable models against the control models varied in their ability to exceed the p<0.001 threshold.
To better understand the rule count, rule diversity, and rule scope effects, we ran four more models (described in Tables S1 and S3), -One linear regression fitting the four types of rule, plus a software count control, against population maximum.
-One negative binomial regression fitting the above variables plus population maximum and its interactions with the four types against core group size. -One linear regression fitting the three types of resource, plus a software count control, against population maximum. -One negative binomial regression fitting the above variables plus population maximum and its interactions with the three types against core group size.
Plots
The plots show the same data as fit to the models, except that we do not display "singular" bins containing only one server. This visualization choice led us to exclude two "above diagonal"
outlier communities that were occupying two above diagonal bins. Including these does not influence the apparent conclusion of the plots, our analyses, or the manuscript. We excluded them to facilitate quick visual inspection of the complex 2D histogram plots that dominate our figures.
Data availability
The data and analysis code will be made available.
